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THE EFFECT OF ERRORS AND CHANGES IN
THE DEBTOR'S NAME ON ARTICLE
NINE1 SECURITY INTERESTS
As part of their plan to make commercial law simple, clear, mod-
ern, and uniform,2 the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) adopted "notice filing" in Article Nine.3 Under this system,
a lender (the "secured party" under the Code)4 may acquire a per-
fected security interest 5 in specified collateral without placing all the
details of the loan agreement on record for public inspection.8 Rather,
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
ALI, NA'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNnFoRM COMMERcIAL
CODE: 1972 OFFIcI L TExT wrrH COMMENTS AND APPENDIX 1972 CHAmNES IN TEXT
[hereinafter cited as UCC];
ALI, NAT'L CONF. OF Comr'Rs ON UNIFORm STATE LAW, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: 1962 OFFICIAL TEx wrrH COMMENTS [hereinafter cited as UCC (1962 version)];
P. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UN FoRM COmimncrA CODE (2d ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as ANDERSON];
R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON TEM UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Supp. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as ANDERSON (Supp. 1974)];
R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACnONS UNDER THE UNrFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE (1973) [hereinafter cited as HENSON];
J. WrrE & R. SuMmS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THm UNrFORM CoMMER-
CIAL CODE (1972) [hereinafter cited as WmRTE & SUMMERS].
1. Article Nine was extensively amended in 1972. The following states have en-
acted the 1972 revisions: Arkansas, California (effective January 1, 1976); Illinois;
Iowa (effective July 1, 1975); Nevada (effective July 1, 1975); North Dakota; Oregon;
Texas; Virginia; West Virginia (effective July 1, 1975); Wisconsin. Earlier versions re-
main in effect in the rest of the states and the District of Columbia, with the exception
of Louisiana, which has not enacted the UCC.
2. UCC H9 1-102(a), (c).
3. id. § 9-402, Comment 2, which provides in pertinent part: "What is required
to be filed is ... only a simple notice which may be filed before the security interest
attaches or thereafter."
4. Id. § 9-105(1) (m); UCC § 9-105(1)(i) (1962 version).
5. "A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all the applica-
ble steps required for perfection have been taken." UCC § 9-303(1). Perfection will
most often be accomplished by filing a financing statement. WHrrn & SummERs § 23-
5, at 796; see UCC § 9-302(1). However, a secured party may perfect a security inter-
est in certain categories of collateral by taking possession of the collateral, id. § 9-305,
and possession is normally a requirement for perfection of a security interest in money
or instruments other than chattel paper, id. § 9-304(1). See generally HENSON H9 4-
1 to -33.
The most important benefit of having a perfected security interest is priority over
a trustee in bankruptcy with respect to the collateral covered by the security agreement.
WHITE & SuMMERS § 23-5, at 796. See note 23 infra.
6. See generally Coogan, Public Notice under the Uniform Commercial Code and
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the document to be recorded, i.e., the financing statement,7 need only
give notice of the security interest; if further information is desired, it
must be acquired from sources outside the filing office.'
Financing statements are indexed in the records according to the
debtor's name.I If the debtor is not properly identified in the financing
statement, a misfiling may result.10 When this happens, one searching
the records under the correct name will ,be unable to locate the financ-
ing statement, and no notice will be given. A failure to give public
notice of a security interest could result in the creation of a "secret
lien," which courts historically have refused to uphold." Therefore,
correct identification of the debtor is crucial for the functioning of the
notice filing system and for the perfection of a security interest.' 2
Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing," 47 IowA L. REv. 289
(1962).
7. See UCC § 9-402; WrrB & Summmis § 23-16, at 833.
8. UCC § 9-402, Comment 2; Coogan, supra note 6, at 317. The comment indi-
cates that "[f]urther inquiry from the parties concerned [secured parties of record and
the prospective debtor who owns the collateral in question] will be necessary to disclose
the complete state of affairs [with respect to the nature of the discovered security in-
terest]."
9. UCC § 9-403(4).
10. Another type of misfiling results when the filing clerk makes an error in filing
the financing statement despite the fact that it was properly prepared. See note 50
infra.
11. Coogan, supra note 6, at 289; see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley,
329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952); cf. Rowley v. Bartholemew, 37 Iowa 374
(1873) (error in description of collateral).
12. The 1962 version of Article Nine did not specifically require that the debtor's
name appear on the financing statement, but virtually every court concluded that this
was necessary. See, e.g., In re Gibson's Discount Pharmacy, Inc., 15 UCC Rep. Serv.
233, 234 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Tenn. 1974); In re Brawn, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 1031, 1037-
38 (Bankr. Ct. D. Me. 1969); WHrm & SuMMERs § 23-16, at 837. However, the de-
cisions are inconsistent when both erroneous and correct versions of the debtor's name
appear in different places in the same financing statement. One view is that the secur-
ity interest will be perfected when the debtor's signature is legible and correct, even
though the filing is improper because of an incorrect name in another part of the financ-
ing statement. See In re Bengtson, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 283, 287 (Bankr. Ct. D. Conn.
1965); Wr & SUMMERS § 23-16, at 838-39. Another view holds the security interest
perfected where the signature is proper unless a showing is made that a misfiling resulted
from the other, improper debtor identification. Compare In re Vaughan, 4 UCC Rep.
Serv. 61, 65 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Mich. 1967), with In re Jones, 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 249,
252-53 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Mich. 1972). A third position is that a printed identification
of the debtor's name is required, absent proof that somehow the financing statement was
properly indexed. See In re Eichler, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 1400, 1404 (Bankr. Ct. E.D.
Wis.), affd, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 1406 (E.D. Wis. 1971); In re Merrill, 9 UCC Rep. Serv.
757, 759 (Bankr. Ct. D. Neb. 1971); In re Brawn, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 565, 571-72
(Bankr. Ct. D. Me. 1970). The 1972 revision has adopted this third view. See UCC
§ 9-402(1).
Since the financing statements are indexed according to the debtor's name, an error
in the identification of the secured party will usually be unimportant. HENsON § 4-
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Problems involving the debtor's name can arise in two ways.
First, the financing statement may not correctly identify -the debtor.
Second, a financing statement which originally gave the correct name
may become misleading as a result of a change in the debtor's name.
ERROR ON THE FINANCING STATEMENT
The UCC allows a financing statement which "substantially" com-
plies with the requirements for validity to be effective, even though it
contains minor, non-misleading errors.13  Apparently, the drafters in-
tended that this substantial compliance test should apply to errors in
the identification of the debtor. A comment to section 9-4021 specif-
ically disapproves the holding in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Haley.15 That case was decided under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act
and involved a filed statement of trust receipt financing which listed
the trustee as E.R. Millen Co., when its correct name was E.R. Millen
Co., Inc. The court held that the omission was serious enough to
render the filing ineffective and to void the security interest.'
In view of the critical function which the debtor's name performs
in the operation of the notice filing system, at least one commentator
suggested that Haley was unwisely chosen as an example of the strict
standard which the substantial compliance test was intended to re-
place.' 7 If this commentator's view were followed, any defect in the
debtor's name would be per se misleading. The substantial compliance
standard would then operate only when an error was made in an item
not required to be furnished in the financing statement. For example,
if the debtor is correctly identified by his individual name, and his trade
name is also given even though not required, an error in the latter need
not be fatal to the perfection of the security interest.'8
6, at 42; WHrr & StmmEs § 23-16, at 841; see In re Wilco Forest Mach., Inc., 491
F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1974).
13. UCC § 9-402(8); UCC § 9-402(5) (1962 version).
14. UCC § 9402, Comment 9.
15. 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952).
16. Id. at 563-65, 109 N.E.2d at 146-47. Comment 9 to section 9-402 characterized
the purpose of the substantial compliance rule of subsection 8 as "designed to discourage
the fanatical and impossibly refined reading of such statutory requirements in which
courts have occasionally indulged themselves." The drafters indicated that the Haley
opinion was "an example of the sort of reasoning which this subsection [8] rejects."
17. Coogan, supra note 6, at 292-93 n.5.
18. National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471
(1963); cf. Still Associates Inc. v. Murphy, 358 Mass. 760, 267 N.E.2d 217 (1971) (er-
ror in description of collateral).
The California version of the UCC includes a requirement that the financing state-
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However, the case law has generally followed the suggestion of
the Code comment, and the substantial compliance test has been held
applicable to errors in the identification of the debtor. The leading
case for this proposition is In re Excel Stores, Inc. 9 The financing
statement in that case gave the debtor's name as Excel Department
Stores when in fact it was Excel Stores, Inc. Both the debtor and a
corporation named Excel Enterprises, Inc. did business at the same ad-
dress. The district court stressed the fact that the erroneous name
made it impossible for a file searcher -to ascertain which corporation
was the debtor and held the security interest to be unperfected. 20  The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, emphasizing that the UCC
simply requires notice and that sufficient notice would be given when
a file searcher came -to the name "Excel" in the records.21
Whether -an error in the debtor's name is so substantial that it
should be deemed seriously misleading necessarily entails an ad hoc
approach. 22  The test which has been adopted is whether, under all
the facts, the filing would have given a file searcher sufficient notice
to justify placing a duty upon him to make further inquiry concerning
the possible lien.23  Such a test certainly will not produce any automatic
ment give the debtor's trade name. CAL. COMMERCIAL CODE § 9402(1) (West 1964).
Where the financing statement fails to give the correct trade name, the security interest
has been held unperfected, despite the fact that the debtor's true name was correctly
listed. In re Thrift Shoe Co., 502 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1974).
19. 341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965).
20. In re Excel Stores, Inc., 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 616 (D. Conn. 1963), rev'd, 341
F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965).
21. 341 F.2d at 963-64.
22. In re Hatfield Constr. Co., 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 907, 911 (Bankr. Ct. M.D. Ga.
1971); 4 ANDERSON § 9-402:27, at 493.
23. See, e.g., In re Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961, 963 (2d Cir. 1965). The test
is phrased in this manner because it is generally not necessary to show that the improp-
erly filed financing statement actually caused a subsequent lender to be misled about
the debtor's financial situation. The sufficiency of the notice given by the financing
statement becomes an issue most frequently in bankruptcy proceedings; the trustee in
bankruptcy has the status of a judgment creditor as of the date of bankruptcy, whether
or not such a creditor actually exists. Bankruptcy Act § 70(c)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)
(1) (1970). The UCC includes the trustee in bankruptcy in its definition of "lien cred-
itor." UCC § 9-301(3); UCC § 9-301(3) (1962 version). Under the 1962 version
of Article Nine a lien creditor takes priority over an unperfected security interest pro-
vided that the lien creditor is without knowledge of the security interest. UCC § 9-
301(1) (1962 version). But, since the trustee's status is a hypothetical one, this provi-
sion causes no problems for him. In re Leichter, 471 F.2d 785, 787 (2d Cir. 1972);
In re Thomas, 466 F.2d 51, 53 (9th Cir. 1972). Under the 1972 Code, a lien creditor's
knowledge of the unperfected security interest is immaterial. See UCC § 9-301(1).
Moreover, since an unperfected security interest in given collateral will be subordinated
to a perfected security interest in the same collateral no matter which version of the
Code is in effect, HENSON § 5-1, at 71, a secured party who has incorrectly identified
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answers. The simpler situations are fairly clear. Where an individual
debtor's first name was spelled Shelia rather than Sheila, this was "ob-
viously" a minor, non-misleading error.24 But the reversal of the
names of the debtor and secured party on the financing statement,
where the two names were completely different, would cause a mis-
filing wholly ineffective to give notice to subsequent file searchers and
would ,thus be seriously misleading.25 In closer cases, great weight is
attached to the similarity between the listed name and the correct one.
If the name under which the financing statement will be indexed is cor-
rect, the security interest will almost always be held perfected even if
other parts of the name are incorrect. Thus, a financing statement
which gave the debtor's name as Nara Distributing, Inc. was sufficient
to perfect a security interest against Nara Non Food Distributing, Inc.2 1
However, where the debtor's name was Brawn, a financing statement
listing it as Brown was seriously misleading. 7
his debtor may discover that his claim cannot take priority over those of later secured
parties who listed the debtor's name properly, even though those lenders had actual
knowledge of the existence of the prior, unperfected security interest. See Bloom v.
Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d 860 (1967). See also National Cash Register Co. v. Mish-
kins, Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 386, 317 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. County Ct. 1970). In National
Cash Register Co. v. Mishkins, Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 386, 317 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. County
Ct. 1970), a creditor was denied the special priority the Code gives to purchase money
secured parties because of a failure to supply the debtor's correct name on the financ-
ing statement. A purchase money secured party who complies with the procedure set
forth in the Code takes priority in collateral which is also covered by the after-acquired
property clause of an earlier security agreement, and there is nothing that the prior se-
cured party can do to prevent his security interest in this collateral from being subordi-
nated. UCC §§ 9-312(3), (4); UCC §§ 9-312(3), (4) (1962 version). Thus, in
Mishkins, there was no possibility that the prior secured party was misled in any way
by the subsequent lender's error in identifying the debtor.
24. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Kurland Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., 57 Misc, 2d 806, 811,
293 N.Y.S.2d 647, 652 (Sup. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 32 App. Div. 2d 643,
300 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1969).
25. In re Uptown Variety, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 221 (Bankr. CL D. Ore. 1969).
26. In re Nara Non Food Distrib., Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 779, 322 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup.
Ct. 1970); accord, In re A & T Kwik-N-Handi, Inc., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 765 (Bankr.
Ct. M.D. Ga. 1973).
27. In re Brawn, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 1031 (Bankr. CL D. Me. 1969); accord, In
re Gibson's Discount Pharmacy, Inc., 15 UCC Rep. Serv. 233 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Tenn.
1974) (financing statement listed debtor as Gibco Discount Drugs, Inc. instead of Gib-
son's Discount Pharmacy of Bristol, Tennessee, Inc.); Bank of N. America v. Bank of
Nutley, 94 N.J. Super. 220, 227 A.2d 535 (1967) (debtor listed as Kaplas instead-of
Kaplan); John Deere Co. v. William C. Pahl Constr. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 872, 300
N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1969), ajj'd, 34 App. Div. 2d 85, 310 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1970)
(debtor listed as Ranelli Construction Co. instead of Ranalli Construction Co.); Na-
tional Cash Register Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1968) (debtor listed as Boywald instead of Borgwald); National Cash Register Co. v.
Mishkins, Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 386, 317 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. County Ct. 1970) (debtor
listed as Mishkins Drug, Inc. instead of Aberdeen.Drugs, Inc.). Contra, In re Causer's
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Factors other than the similarity between listed and correct names
can also enter into consideration. In In re Gustafson,2" the individual
debtor's -true name was Gustafson. When he moved to Oklahoma, he
obtained a chauffeur's license on which his name was spelled Gustav-
sen. Following an unsuccessful attempt to have the license corrected,
the debtor began to use the improper spelling routinely in his trans-
aotions. Finding an absence of bad faith or carelessness on the part
of the secured party, the court ruled that a financing statement giving
the incorrect spelling was sufficient to perfect a security interest. 29
In In re Hatfield Construction Co.,3" the company was the actual debtor
but the financing statement was filed under the name of its president,
Wayne L. Hatfield. In an opinion which blithely ignored the separate
identity of the corporation, the court held that the security interest was
perfected. The court justified -this result by pointing out that the case
involved a local filing;31 subsequent file searchers would have had act-
ual access to the records and 'the file contained only a few financing
statements.32 In view of these facts, the court regarded the identity
between the president's surname and the corporate name as sufficient
to require an interested party to make further inquiry.s
On the other hand, a few courts have rejected the ad hoc approach
and have taken a dim view of any error in identifying the debtor. For
example, In re Raymond F. Sargent, Inc.34 held a security interest un-
perfected because the financing statement improperly included "Co."
in the corporate debtor's name.35 Nevertheless, proof that the financ-
Town & Country Super MkL, Inc., 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 541 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ohio 1965)
(debtor listed as Robert Causer and Grace Causer dba Causer's Town & Country Super
Market, Inc. instead of corporate name alone); see In re Vaughan, 4 UCC Rep. Serv.
61 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Mich. 1967) (financing statement gave debtor's name as both
Vaught and Voughn rather than Vaughan); cf. In re Green Mill Inn, Inc., 474 F.2d
14 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (actual notice available because of state practice of
cross-indexing).
28. 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 231 (Bankr. CL W.D. Okla. 1973).
29. Id. at 232-33.
30. 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 907 (Bankr. Ct. M.D. Ga. 1971).
31. The Georgia version of the UCC requires filing to be made on a county-by-
county basis instead of having a central, state-wide filing office. GA. CODE ANN. §
109A-9-401 (1) (b) (1962).
32. 10 UCC Rep. Serv. at 911-12.
33. Id.
34. 8 UC Rep. Serv. 583 (Bankr. Ct. D. Me. 1970).
35. Contra, In re A & T Kwik-N-Handi, Inc., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 765 (Bankr. Ct.
M.D. Ga. 1973) (omission of "Inc." in debtor's name).
The Sargent decision has not found favor with the commentators. See IENSON §
4-6, at 42 n.23 ("[perhaps the least defensible decision in this area!'); WmroT &
SUMMERS § 23-16, at 840-41 ("[tlhe referee wholly misconstrues the function of [the
1962 version of] 9-402(5)").
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ing statement was filed in the same place in which it would have been
filed if no error had been made might influence these courts to find
that the security interest was perfected. In other litigation arising out
of the bankruptcy of -the ill-starred Raymond F. Sargent Corporation,
the referee held that a financing statement listing the debtor as Sargent,
Raymond, F., Inc. was sufficient because the filing clerk had gratui-
tously made a cross-indexing under the proper name.3 6 However, the
referee could have held such a filing to be immaterial since the statu-
torily required notice was not given.17
The ad hoc approach has also generally prevailed in a line of cases
in which the filing was made under the trade or business name of an
individual debtor.38  Here, too, the dispositive factor has often been
the similarity between the listed and correct names. So, where the in-
dividual debtor, Henry Platt, did business both as Platt Furniture Co.
and Kenwell Fur Novelty Co., a financing statement using the former
name was adequate -to perfect a security interest, but -the use of the
latter would have been insufficient.39
Some cases have taken a more favorable view of a trade name
filing. In re Bengtson4 ° upheld a security interest filed under Bruce's
Vernon Circle Service where the debtor's name was Bruce Bengtson.
The court acknowledged that such a filing would not reveal the exist-
ence of the security interest, but since the 1962 version of the Code
36. In re Raymond F. Sargent, Inc., 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 746 (Bankr. Ct. D. Me.
1970).
37. See In re Wishart, 10 UCO Rep. Serv. 1296 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Mich. 1972).
38. In cases involving partnerships, it has been generally assumed that filing should
be made under the partnership name. HENSON § 4-6, at 41; see, e.g., In re Humphrey,
12 UCO Rep. Serv. 986 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Tenn. 1973). The 1972 version of Article
Nine codifies this rule. See UCC § 9-402(7).
39. In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966); accord, In re Leichter, 471 F.2d
785 (2d Cir. 1972) (debtor's surname was Leichter; trade name was Landman Dry
Cleaners); In re Hill, 363 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Miss. 1973) (debtor's surname was Hll;
trade name was Carolyn's Fashions); In re Firth, 363 F. Supp. 369 (M.D. Ga. 1973)
(debtor's surname was Firth; trade name was National Photocopy Equipment Co.); In
re Jones, 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 249 (Bankr. Ct W.D. Mich. 1972) (debtor's surname was
Jones; trade name was The Tape Shack); In re Eichler, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 1400 (Bankr.
Ct. E.D. Wis.), alf'd, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 1406 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (debtor's surname was
Eichler; trade name was Carriage Card & Record Shop); In re Merrill, 9 UCC Rep.
Serv. 757 (Bankr. Ct. D. Neb. 1971) (debtor's surname was Merrill; trade name was
Reliable TV Service); In re Levins, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 1076 (Bankr. Ct. E.D.N.Y. 1970)
(debtor's surname was Levins; trade name was F. & F. Luncheonette); In re Thomas,
310 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 466 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1972) (debtor's sur-
name was Thomas; trade name was West Coast Avionics); In re Osborn, 6 UCC Rep.
Serv. 227 (Bankr. CL W.D. Mich. 1969) (debtor's surname was Osborn; trade name was
H & M Distributing Co.).
40. 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 283 (Bankr. Ct. D. Conn. 1965).
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contained no requirement that the debtor's name be given, the court
could perceive no defect in the filing.41
Other courts have adopted a stricter standard. In re Wishart42
held a security interest to be unperfeoted where the financing state-
ment listed the debtor as Wishart Equipment Co. The debtor's sur-
name was Wishart and the filing clerk had cross-indexed the financing
statement under the individual name, though not required to do so.
The court did not consider either of these faots to be relevant.4 3  Like-
wise, in In re Brawn,44 a financing statement indexed under Brawn's
Super Market was held seriously misleading despite the fact that the
debtor was named Wendall P. Brawn. However, the referee indicated
that, had a gratuitous cross-indexing been made under the latter name,
the security interest would have been perfected. 45
One commentator has argued in favor of a distinction between a
"casual" or "random" 'trade name and an "established" trade name,
maintaining that a filing made using the latter should be sufficient.46
There is authority both for and against this position.47 However, the
better approach would avoid such a distinction. Otherwise, added con-
fusion will be introduced into the law since courts would be forced to
deal with -the question of what constitutes an "established" trade
name,48 and there is already more ambiguity in this area than would be-
desirable in light of the Code policies of "simplicity, clarity, and uni-
formity. 49
41. Id. at 287. The 1972 version of Article Nine would require a different result.
See UCC § 9-402(1).
42. 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 1296 (Bankr. CL W.D. Mich. 1972).
43. Id. at 1298, 1300-01.
44. 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 565 (Bankr. Ct. D. Me. 1970).
45. Id. at 572-73.
46. 4 ANDER SON § 9-402:31, at 500-01.
47. Compare In re Thomas, 466 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1972), with In re Kann, 6 UCC
Rep. Serv. (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1969). See also Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp.
v. Esslair Endsley Co., 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 176 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
48 See generally HENSON § 4-6, at 41.
49. UCC § 1-102(2); see Hawkland, Article 9 Methodology, 9 WAYNE L. Ray. 531,
536 (1963). The amended version of Article Nine provides that the financing state-
ment is sufficient if it gives the individual debtor's name, whether or not it includes
the trade name. UCC § 9-402(7). Mr. Anderson has argued that this amendment only
establishes a "harmless surplusage" rule which does not reach the situation of a filing
made in the trade name alone. ANDERSON § 9-402:31, at 1314 (Supp. 1974). How-
ever, it appears that the intent of the drafters of the amendment was to disapprove fil-
ings made only under trade names. See UCC § 9-402, Comment 7, which provides in
pertinent part: 'Trade names are deemed to be too uncertain and too likely not to be




Moreover, as long as the secured party is careful to identify his
debtor properly, he will be able to acquire a perfected security inter-
est."0 To this extent, the law is in fact simple, clear, and uniform.
Where the secured party does not take such care and makes an error
in naming the debtor, the fact that the security interest may have an
uncertain fate should not be ,too disturbing. The secured party was
in a position to guard against this result,5 and any difficulty which flows
from his failure to do so ought not give him cause for complaint.
DEBTOR'S CHANGE OF NAME
The justification for the uncertain status of the security interest
when the financing statement never correctly identified the debtor does
not necessarily exist when, after the filing, the debtor acquires a new
name which is materially different from the original one.52  Such a
post-filing name change could arise as a result of'legal proceedings in
the case of an individual debtor (e.g., divorce), or by a merger, con-
solidation, or charter amendment in the case of a corporate debtor. As
long as the initial filing was made using the debtor's then-correct
name,' the creation of a secret lien following the change cannot be
attributed to 'the secured party's failure ,to insure the perfection of -the
50. A misfiling which is attributable solely to the filing clerk's error should not
cause the security interest to be unperfected.
[Under Section 9-403(1) the secured party does not bear the risk that the
filing officer will not properly perform his duties: under that section the se-
cured party has complied with the filing requirements when he presents his fi-
nancing statement for filing and the filing fee has been tendered or the state-
ment accepted by the filing officer. UCC § 9-407, Comment 1;
accord, In re Royal Electrotype Corp., 485 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that the
UCC has changed the Pennsylvania common law rule); In re May Lee Indus., Inc., 380
F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1407 (2d Cir. 1974); see UCC § 9-403,
Comment 1.
51. See in re Thomas, 310 F. Supp. 338, 340 (N.D. Cal. 1970), afj'd, 466 F.2d
51 (9th Cir. 1972).
52. If the new name is not materially different from the old one, the security inter-
est can be held perfected under the substantial compliance test. ADmERSON § 9-
402:31.2, at 1315 (Supp. 1974); see Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Bank of Main,
36 Cal. App. 3d 286, 111 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1973).
53. A bizarre case in which a financing statement error was combined with a
change of name is In re A-1 Imperial Moving & Storage Co., 350 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.-
Fla. 1972). There the debtor did business under the trade name A-1 Imperial Moving
& Storage Co., Inc. and this was the only name listed on the financing statement. About
two weeks after the financing statement was filed, the debtor incorporated under the
name 6105 Corporation but continued to use the former trade name. Subsequently, the
debtor adopted the trade name as its official corporate name, thereby causing the name
listed on the financing statement to correspond to the true name. The secured party
was unaware of any of these transactions. The court, somewhat hesitatingly, concluded
that the final name change "breathed lifi" into the previously invalid security interest,
to. at 1189,
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security interest at the time the financing statement was prepared. To
the contrary, the secured party has complied with all 'the requirements
necessary for the perfection of the security interest, and the question
is whether the debtor's act in changing its name can cause the security
interest to become unperfected. 54
The 1962 version of Article Nine provided no guidance for -the
resolution of 'this issue. There seems to be agreement that the security
interest will be deemed perfected, at least as to the pre-change col-
lateral, if the secured party is unaware of the name change.55 But ,the
courts have taken inconsistent positions when the secured party has
knowledge of the use of a new name by the debtor but takes no action
to give notice to subsequent file searchers. Some courts have held the
secured party's knowledge to be immaterial. In In re Gac,"6 an in-
dividual debtor granted a security interest in a piano to a credit union.
At that time the debtor's name was Charlotte A. Mead, and it was so
listed on 'the financing statement. Later she divorced and her maiden
name, Charlotte A. Gac, was restored -to her in the divorce proceedings.
The secured party was aware of this but did nothing to correct its fin-
ancing statement. The referee was unable to ascertain any difference
between .this situation and one in which the secured party had no know-
ledge of the debtor's name change since the predicament of subsequent
file searchers would be the same in either event.5 7 Thus, the security
interest was held perfected.58
A different attitude toward the effect of the secured party's know-
ledge was manifested in In re Veith's, Inc5 9 There, the individual
debtor, Kuhn, did business under ,the trade name Veith's. The financ-
ing statement was filed only under the individual name. The debtor
then incorporated his business as Veith's, Inc. and transferred the col-
lateral to the corporation. The secured party knew of these transac-
tions but took no action. The referee found that the secured party's
knowledge was tantamount to an authorized disposition of the collateral
54. The UCC contemplates that certain acts done by the debtor can invalidate a
security interest. For example, a sale of the collateral made in the ordinary course of
the debtor's business win usually result in the loss of a security interest in that collateral.
UCC § 9-307(1).
55. See In re Veith's, Inc., 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 943, 948 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Wis. 1971);
In re The Grape Arbor, Inc., 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 632, 633 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1969).
56. 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 412 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Mich. 1972).
57. Id. at 414.
58. Accord, In re Pasco Sales Co., 77 Misc. 2d 724, 354 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct.
1974) (corporate debtor amended charter to change name from Pacific Supply Co. to
Pasco Sales Co.).
59. 9 TCC Rep. Serv. 943 (Ban4r. CL E.D. Wis, 1971).
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which voided the security interest.60
Veith's could be limited to the situation where there is a change
of the entity of the debtor (e.g., from individual to corporate) followed
by a transfer of the collateral to -the new entityA1  A different type
of decision, one clearly suggesting ramifications beyond the specific
facts of the case, is In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc.62 In that case,
the secured party was Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc. and the debtor
was Roman Industrial Corporation. At the time the security agree-
ment was entered into, both parties were planning to make a name
change: the debtor was to adopt the name of the secured party and
vice versa. Although the security agreement demonstrated that each
was aware of -the other's plans, the financing statement listed only Ro-
man Industrial Corporation as the debtor. The contemplated name
changes were made after filing. Relying on the good faith obligation
set forth in section 1-203, the Sixth Circuit held that the secured party
had not perfected its security interest:
When a secured party has knowledge at the time the security agree-
ment is executed that the debtor intends to change its name, and the
new name is known to him, the secured party must act in good faith
to insure that the filing under the Code not only discloses the current
and correct name of the debtor but also reflects the pending name change
of which the parties are aware.6 3
Although 'the court was careful to emphasize -that its decision did not
reach the situation where the secured party learns of 'the new name
after filing the financing statement,6 4 its sensitivity to -the need for an
accurate identification of the debtor 5 and its conception of good faith
as at times requiring affirmative action on the part of the secured
party6" strongly indicate -that a similar good faith test would be applied
in the Gac situation.
60. Id. at 946-48; see UCC § 9-306(2).
61. See In re Gac, 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 412, 415 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Mich. 1972).
If this is the correct interpretation of Veith's, it is not a change of name case at all.
The security interest would also have become unperfected had Kuhn incorporated as
Kuhn, Inc. and transferred the collateral to the corporation with the secured party's
knowledge, even though the filing could be held not seriously misleading pursuant to
the substantial compliance test. Viewed in this way, Veith's has been overruled by the
1972 amendments. See UCC § 9-402(7).
62. 503 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1974).
63. Id. at 1222.
64. Id. at 1224.
65. Id. at 1221.
66. Id. at 1222, quoting King, Policy Decisions and Security Agreements Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 556, 561 (1963). See also John Deere
Co. v. William C. Pahl Constr. Co., 34 App. Div. 2d 85, 89, 310 N.Y.S.2d 945, 949
(1970).
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The 1972 amendments to Article Nine include a sentence which
speaks directly to the problem created by the debtor's change of name:
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organiza-
tion its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed financing state-
ment becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to perfect
a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four
months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement
is filed before the expiration of that time.67
No reported decision has applied this provision. One commentator
has suggested that the amendment establishes a rule whereby the sec-
urity interest will be perfected as to the pre-change collateral and col-
lateral acquired within the four-month period, but it will be unperfected
with respect to collateral acquired more than four months after the
change unless a new filing is made. 68 This reading would establish
a Gac rule subject to a four-month limitation on perfection of a sec-
urity interest in after-acquired collateral. That is, the security interest
in the pre-change collateral and collateral acquired during the four-
month period would be perfected irrespective of the secured party's
knowledge.
However, a comment to the 1972 version of the Code suggests
a contrary interpretation. The comment states that the security interest
should be deemed perfected as to the pre-change collateral if the
financing statement is "legally still valid under the circumstances" and
as to collateral acquired during the four-month span if the financing
statement is "still operative under the particular circumstances."6 9  If
any content is to be given to these phrases, the best sources would seem
to be found in the policy against the creation of secret liens and the
requirement of good faith, -the crucial factors in the rule suggested by
Kalamazoo. By basing the interpretation of the amendment on these
two factors, it is possible to avoid both undeserved leniency to a secured
party who has knowingly acquiesced in the continued existence of a
secret lien, as well as undue harshness to a secured party who honestly
believes his financing statement is still capable of giving notice. Ac-
cordingly, the four-month period would represent the time during
which an unaware secured party could acquire a perfected security in-
terest in after-acquired collateral. In other words, if the secured party
has not refiled within four months, the amendment creates a conclusive
presumption that he has either been negligent or has acted in bad faith,
67. UCC § 9-402(7). This apparently represents the first statutory attempt to deal
with the change of name problem. HENSON § 4-6, at 41.
68. ANDEsoN §§ 9-402:31.3-.4, at 1315-16 (Supp. 1974).
69. UCC § 9-402, Comment 7.
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and he is prevented from continuing to take advantage of the secret
lien. But, if the secured party was without knowledge uTtil it was too
late ,to matter (e.g., until the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy), the
security interest would nevertheless be held perfected with respect to
both -the pre-change collateral and collateral acquired within four
months of the name change. On -the other hand, if the secured party
learned of the new name but failed to make a refiling, the security in-
terest would become unperfected as to all -the collateral, whenever ac-
quired, because the secured party did not act in good faith to make
his financing statement effective to give notice.70
Therefore, under both the 1962 and 1972 versions of the UCC,
courts are in a position to choose between conflicting rules. The Gac
opinion contained several justifications for holding that the secured par-
ty's knowledge is immaterial. First, it was asserted that the secured
party should not be required to prove a negative, that is, the absence
of knowledge. 71 Second, the court pointed out that hardship would be
imposed on the secured party if the debtor refused -to sign a new financ-
ing statement; in that event, the secured party could not possibly correct
the misleading filing. 72  Finally, it was suggested that file searchers
were under a duty to inquire about any prior name of the debtor."
The first argument can easily be met by requiring the party seek-
ing -to avoid the security interest to establish the secured party's know-
ledge. If the opposing party cannot meet this burden, the secured
party would have a perfected security interest in the pre-change colla-
teral and in either all the after-acquired collateral (under the 1962
Code) or the collateral acquired during he four-month period (under
70. The discussion in the text assumes a conflict between a trustee in bankruptcy
and a secured party with knowledge who has not made a filing at all. If the secured
party made a refiling after the four-month interval, but before the date of bankruptcy,
the secured party should prevail over the trustee, since sufficient notice was available
at the time the latter's hypothetical lien creditor status arose. Cf. In re A-I Imperial
Moving & Storage Co., 350 F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
If a subsequent creditor properly perfects a security interest in the encumbered col-
lateral, he would take priority both as to pre- and post-change collateral. If the prior
secured party was without knowledge, however, the priority of the subsequent lender
would extend only to collateral acquired after the four-month interval. Where the 1972
amendment is not in effect and the secured party does not have knowledge of the new
name, he would have priority as to all the collateral, whether acquired before the name
change, during the four-month post-change interval, or after the four-month period. See
note 74 infra and accompanying text.
71. In re Gac, 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 412, 414 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Mich. 1972).
72. Id.; see UCC § 9-402 (1962 version). The 1972 amendments have eliminated
this problem. The secured party does not have to obtain the debtor's signature on the
corrected financing statement. UCC § 9-402(2) (d).
73. 11 UCC Rep. Serv. at 414-15.
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the 1972 amendment). 74  However, once the secured party's know-
ledge is established, the burden would be on him to show that he acted
in good faith to give notice to later file searchers. The good faith stan-
dard would eliminate the problem of the uncooperative debtor under
the 1962 Code.75 If the secured party put forth his best efforts, he
would be protected even'though ,these efforts were unsuccessful.
The third argument is also unpersuasive since it is the filed financ-
ing statements which are to place file searchers on inquiry. The UCC
should not be read to require a search outside the filing office unless
there is something inside the office to spark it.7 Thus, a duty 'to dis-
cover a debtor's prior names should not be imposed.77
The only real advantage of the Gac rule that the secured party's
knowledge is irrelevant is that it creates a "bright line" -test. Such a
rule would be easy to administer, produce readily predictable results,
establish certainty and clarity in commercial law, and tend to eliminate
litigation. All of -these may be said to be goals of the UCC. 8  A rule
which requires an inquiry into the secured party's knowledge and good
faith, on the other hand, would necessitate an ad hoc examination of
the faots of each case. Still, there is a significant difference between
a case involving a secured party with knowledge and a case involving
a secured party without knowledge, and this difference compels the re-
jection of Gac. In the former situation, the secured party realizes 'that
he has a secret lien. Punishing this secured party by voiding the secu-
rity interest will advance the goals of notice filing by discouraging -the
recurrence of this "variety of secret lien.71  Punishing a secured party
74. Mr. Anderson maintains that the name change should cause the security interest
to become unperfected as to all after-acquired collateral under the 1962 Code. ANDER-
SON § 9-402:31.4, at 1316 (Supp. 1974). There does not seem to be any justification
for this result when the secured party was without knowledge of the name change. In
such a situation the secured party has done everything he could do to comply with the
Code, and holding the security interest unperfected will do nothing to discourage the
creation of that type of secret lien. Cf. In re Gustafson, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 231
(Bankr. Ct. W.D. Okla. 1973). See notes 79-80 infra and accompanying text.
75. Where the 1972 amendments are in effect, this problem will not arise. See
UCC § 9-402(2)(d).
76. See Wrrn & Summ § 23-16, at 833; Coogan, supra note 6, at 318 n.100.
77. Contra, In re Pasco Sales Co., 77 Misc. 2d 724, 727, 354 N.Y.S.2d 402, 405
(Sup. Ct. 1974).
78. See Hawkland, supra note 49, at 536.
79. Cf. John Deere Co. v. William C. Pahl Constr. Co., 34 App. Div. 2d 85, 310
N.Y.S.2d 945 (1970). In that case, the filing clerk sent an acknowledgement copy of
the financing statement to the secured party which showed that an erroneous identifica-
tion of the debtor had been made. The court regarded the secured party's failure to
take action to correct the error after thus learning of it as justification for not giving




who was unaware of the name change would serve no similar deterrent
function.80 By failing -to appreciate this difference and holding the sec-
ured party's knowledge to be immaterial, a court invites the prolifera-
tion of secret liens. Such a holding cannot be defended on the
grounds that it produces certainty and clarity, for its result must inevit-
ably be contrary to the purpose of the notice filing system.
CONCLUSION
The lessons to be learned by the would-be secured party from a
review of the law relating -to errors and changes in the debtor's name
are clear. If the potential secured party wishes -to take the least pos-
sible risk, he should first make a careful inquiry into the precise identity
of ,the contemplated debtor. A search of the filing system should then
be made under this name as well as similar names, and any possible pre-
existing security interests that are uncovered should be investigated.
It would also be wise to attempt to discover any prior name of the deb-
tor and to conduct a similar search of the files as to it. Even though
this step is not a Code requirement, it is recommended since there is
no guarantee that a prior security interest, filed under a former name
of the debtor, will be subordinated to that of a later secured party.
If these inquiries do not reveal the presence of any other secured
party, the would-be secured party may proceed, but he should be care-
ful -to make certain that his financing statement lists the precise name
of the debtor. One suggested procedure for the secured party to follow
would be to present the financing statement for filing before the trans-
action is consummated. Shortly before closing the deal another search
of -the files should be made. In this way the secured party could as-
certain whether his financing statement had been properly indexed, as
well as discover any security interests which might have been filed after
the initial search."'
PahI is distinguishable from In re Royal Electrotype Corp., 485 F.2d 394 (3d Cir.
1973), where an error in the debtor's name was reflected on the receipt the secured party
received from the filing clerk. In the latter case, the court stated that the error did
not come to light until after the debtor had become bankrupt. Id. at 395.
80. Cf. In re Gustafson, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 231 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Okla. 1973).
81. This idea was proposed by Professor John Weistart in his commercial law class
at Duke Law School. Professor Weistart recognizes that there are two sources of diffi-
culty with this procedure. First, in the case of a creditor who customarily makes a large
number of relatively small loans, the cost of the extra record search may not be justified.
Second, debtors are not likely to be receptive to the practice of placing a notice of a
lien against the collateral prior to actually receiving the loan proceeds.
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